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Abstract	  Conventional	   capture	   models	   rely	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   regulator	   is	   induced	   to	   lenient	  behavior	  by	  the	  regulated	  firm	  through	  offers	  of	  monetary	  transfers,	  the	  bribery	  model,	  or	  future	  employment,	  the	  revolving	  doors	  model.	  To	  avoid	  socially	  costly	  capture,	  	  the	  political	   principal	   should	   then	   either	   implement	   collusion-­‐proof	   mechanisms	   through	  the	  delegation	  of	  welfare	  gains,	  or	  severely	  restrict	  the	  career	  paths	  of	  regulatory	  staff.	  The	  paradox	  of	   capture	   is	   that	   neither	   the	   two	  modes	  of	   capture,	   nor	   the	   remedy	   are	  commonly	   found	   in	   practice.	   This	   paper	   proposes	   to	   rethink	   capture	   based	   on	   the	  widespread	   use	   of	   industry-­‐commissioned	   consultants,	   experts	   and	   lobbyists	   that	  produce	   information	   for	   regulatory	  and	  policy	  use.	  A	   small	  model	   (Agrell	   and	  Gautier,	  2010)	  introduces	  a	  'soft	  capture'	  concept	  based	  on	  a	  self-­‐enforced	  collusion	  between	  the	  firm	   and	   regulator,	   linked	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   regulator	   as	   information-­‐processing	  intermediate	  for	  the	  political	  principal.	  The	  firm	  puts	  processed	  but	  biased	  information	  at	   the	   free	  disposal	  of	   the	  regulator,	   'no	  strings	  attached',	  who	  can	  then	  either	  use	   the	  submitted	   information	   or	   produce	   a	   more	   accurate	   information	   by	   a	   costly	   process.	  Under	  a	  set	  of	  mild	  conditions,	   the	  equilibrium	  involves	  soft	  capture	  and	  the	  regulator	  uses	  the	  submitted	  information,	  leading	  to	  some	  distortions	  in	  welfare.	  A	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Occupational	   Safety	   and	  Health	   Administration	   (OSHA)	   in	  USA	   serves	   to	  motivate	  and	   illustrate	   the	   model.	   As	   shown	   by	   the	   case,	   the	   soft	   capture	   model	   may	   have	   a	  stronger	   positive	   potential	   than	   the	   conventional	   models,	   also	   implying	   that	   policy	  advice	  based	  on	  it	  may	  be	  valuable.	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1.	  Introduction	  	  The	   design	   of	   a	   regulatory	   process	   is	   a	   challenging	   task	   as	   it	   involves	   complex	  information	   economic	   settings	   and	   the	   participation	   of	   many	   actors:	   politicians,	  executive,	   legislature,	   supervisors,	   auditors,	   regulated	   firms	   or	   industry,	   customers,	  taxpayers,	   trade	   unions.	   These	   stakeholders	   can	   be	   categorized	   in	   three	   groups:	  [political]	   decision	   makers,	   supervisors	   and	   interest	   groups.	   With	   this	   distinction	   in	  mind,	  the	  regulatory	  process	  can	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  three-­‐layer	  hierarchy	  with,	  on	  the	  top,	   the	   decision	   maker	   (the	   political	   principal),	   in	   the	   middle	   the	   supervisor	   (the	  regulatory	   agency)	   and	   on	   the	   bottom	   the	   regulated	   firm	   (see	   Figure	   1[a]).	   In	   such	   a	  hierarchical	   organization,	   the	   bottom	   layer	   has	   privileged	   access	   to	   key	   information	  relevant	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  Regulated	  firms,	  for	  instance,	  have	  private	  information	  on	  firm	   and	   industry	   costs,	   demand	   characteristics	   and	   available	   technologies.	   This	  asymmetry	  of	  information	  reduces	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regulatory	  process.	  To	  fill	  in	  the	  information	  gap,	  the	  political	  principal	  appoints	  a	  supervisor.	  The	  regulatory	  agency	  is	  thus	  an	  information	  gathering	  intermediate	  for	  the	  political	  principal	  who	  remains	  in	  charge	  of	   the	  main	   regulatory	   tasks2.	  Performing	   in	   this	   task,	   the	   regulatory	  authority	  deploys	  resources,	  permanent	  and	  temporary	  staff,	  consultants	  and	  experts,	  in	  order	  to	  collect,	   process	   and	   produce	   information	   for	   policy-­‐making	   relevant	   to	   the	   regulated	  sector.	   Information	   is	   valuable	   for	   the	  political	  principal	   as	   it	   reduces	   the	   information	  rent	  left	  to	  the	  regulated	  firm.	  Improved	  information	  quality	  (precision)	  reduces	  the	  cost	  of	   regulating	   the	   industry,	  primarily	   through	  a	  welfare	   increase	  by	   lower	  downstream	  prices	   or	   higher	   quality	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   (at	   least	   some)	   firms.	   Effective	   information	  gathering	   by	   the	   regulatory	   authorities	   is	   thus	   essential	   for	   an	   efficient	   regulatory	  process.	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	   regulatory	   intervention	   is	   not	   immune	   to	   capture.	   Dal	   Bó	   (2006,	   p.	   133)	  broadly	   defines	   capture	   as	   “the	   process	   through	   which	   special	   interests	   affect	   state	  intervention	  in	  any	  of	  its	  form”.	  Applied	  to	  industry	  regulation3,	  capture	  could	  be	  more	  specifically	   defined	   as	   “the	   process	   through	   which	   regulated	   monopolies	   end	   up	  manipulating	   the	   state	   agencies	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	   control	   them”	   Dal	   Bó	   (2006,	   p.	  133).	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  on	  capture	  of	  regulatory	  agencies	  by	  the	  regulated	  industry	  they	  are	  charged	  to	  monitor.	  	  	  	  	  	  There	   are	   different	   forms	   of	   regulatory	   capture.	   Estache	   and	   Wren-­‐Lewis	   (2011)	  distinguish	  capture	  of	  decisions	   and	  capture	  of	   information.	  The	   former	  corresponds	   to	  situations	  where	  a	  firm	  or	  an	  industry	  directly	  tries	  to	  influence	  the	  decision	  made.	  The	  latter	  corresponds	  to	  situations	  where	  the	  industry	  tries	  to	  manipulate	  the	  information	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   the	   decision	   is	   made.	   This	   distinction	   echoes	   another	   between	  
direct	   and	   indirect	   capture.	   Direct	   capture	   denotes	   settings	   where	   the	   regulated	   firm	  exerts	   influence	   over	   the	   regulator	   itself,	   while	   indirect	   capture	   denotes	   situations	  where	   the	  regulated	   firm	   influences	   the	  regulator	   indirectly	  by	  manipulating	  decision-­‐
                                                2	  Note	  that	  even	  if	  the	  regulator	  is	  endowed	  with	  some	  decisional	  power,	  like	  the	  right	  to	  set	  a	  price-­‐cap	  level,	  many	   regulatory	   tasks	   remain	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   political	   power:	   decisions	   regarding	   industrial	  structure,	  organization	  and	   financing	  of	  universal	  service	  obligations,	   the	   industry	  safety	  regulation,	   the	  quality	  regulation,	  the	  access	  regulation	  in	  network	  industries,	  the	  procedure	  to	  allocate	  new	  licenses	  (for	  instance	  for	  the	  4G	  cellular	  technology)	  to	  cite	  a	  few.	  3	  Industry	  regulation	  encompasses	  many	  dimensions	  such	  economic,	  product,	  technical,	  quality,	  safety	  or	  environmental	  regulation	  of	  sectors	  and/or	  natural	  monopolies.	  
making	  instances4	  who	  hold	  power	  over	  the	  regulated	  agency.	  When	  the	  regulator	  is	  the	  sole	  responsible	  for	  filling	  the	  information	  gap	  between	  the	  firm	  and	  the	  decision	  maker,	  the	   two	   distinctions	   overlap.	   If	   one	   refer	   to	   our	   three	   layer	   hierarchy,	   direct	   capture	  encompasses	   all	   the	   activities	   by	   the	   regulated	   firm	   to	   manipulate	   the	   information	  collected	  and	  reported	  by	  the	  supervisor,	  hence	  a	  form	  of	  capture	  by	  information	  while	  all	  the	  influence	  activities	  exerted	  to	  modify	  the	  principal's	  behavior	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  indirect	   capture	   or	   capture	   of	   decision.	   An	   additional	   classification	   separates	   illegal	  (fraud,	  corruption,	  extortion)	  and	  legal	  (lobbying,	  career	  concerns)	  influence	  activities.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Indirect	   Direct	  
Legal	   Lobbying	  	   Revolving	  doors	  
Soft	  capture	  
Illegal	   Corruption	   Classical	  capture	  	   Table	  1:	  A	  classification	  of	  capture	  activities	  	  Table	  1	  provides	   some	  structure	   to	   the	   classifications.	  Lobbying	  by	  organized	   interest	  groups	   to	   obtain	   a	   favorable	   decision	   from	   a	   politician	   is	   both	   indirect	   and	   legal:	  Lobbyists	   try	   to	   obtain	   favors	   from	   the	  political	   power	   and	  not	   from	   the	   regulator	  by	  providing	   information	   about	   preferences	   among	   the	   electorate	   or	   political	   alliances.	  When	  an	  interest	  group	  uses	  an	  illegal	  mean,	  for	  instance	  a	  bribe,	  to	  obtain	  a	  favorable	  decision	   from	   a	   politician,	   this	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   labeled	   as	   lobbying	   but	   rather	   as	  corruption.	   Evidences	   on	   corruption	   and	   lobbying	   are	   widespread	   and	   highly	  documented.	  	  	  	  	  	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper,	  we	  leave	  aside	  indirect	  capture	  and	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  direct	   capture.	   In	   the	   literature,	   direct	   capture	   has	   been	   considered	   along	   two	  complementary	   lines:	   the	   classical	   view	  pioneered	   by	   the	  works	   of	   Tirole	   (1986)	   and	  Laffont	  and	  Tirole	   (1991,	  1993)	  and	   the	   revolving	  doors	  approach	   (Che,	  1995).	   In	   the	  classical	   view,	   capture	   consists	   mainly	   in	   bribing	   the	   regulator	   for	   not	   reporting	   or	  misreporting	   relevant	   information	   to	   the	   political	   principal.	   Capture	   is	   envisaged	   as	   a	  phenomenon	  based	  on	  an	  exchange	  of	   favors.	  The	  regulator	  accepts	   to	  be	   lenient	  with	  the	  firm,	  for	  instance	  by	  leaving	  the	  price	  unchanged	  in	  a	  rate	  review.	  In	  return,	  the	  firm	  rewards	  the	  regulator,	  for	  instance	  by	  offering	  monetary	  bribes	  or	  any	  kind	  of	  transfer	  such	  as	  access	   to	  privileged	   information	   (stock/business	   information)	  or	   contracts	   for	  services	  (indirect	  business).	  Figure	  1[b]	  schematizes	  the	  traditional	  capture.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   classical	   view	  on	   capture	   is	  based	  on	   reciprocity.	  Exchange	  of	   favors	   is	  organized	  within	   an	   explicit	   or	   implicit	   illegal	   side-­‐contract	   between	   the	   regulator	   and	   the	   firm.	  The	   revolving	   doors	   approach	   of	   capture	   is	   based	   on	   the	   same	   premises:	   offering	  lucrative	   post-­‐regulatory	   employment	   in	   the	   regulated	   sector	   (revolving	   doors)	   can	  serve	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   exchanging	   favors.	   The	   prospect	   of	   future	   employment	   is	  never	   explicit	   during	   the	   regulatory	   term,	   nor	   are	   the	   conditions	   or	   tasks	   potentially	  assigned	  to	  the	  staff.	  This	  exchange	  of	  favors	  is	  hence	  based	  on	  an	  implicit	  contract	  with	  imperfect	  enforcement	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  illegal5.	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                4	  Ministries,	  other	  branches	  of	  government,	  legislature,	  etc.	  5	  Notwithstanding,	  many	  regulatory	  authorities	  have	  explicit	  regulations	  limiting	  or	  delaying	  employment	  of	  authority	  staff	  in	  regulated	  firms,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  use	  of	  information	  obtained	  through	  their	  service	  in	  the	  authority.	  None	  of	  these	  regulations	  can	  be	  said	  to	  effectively	  block	  the	  revolving	  door	  concerns.	  
	  	  
	  Figure	  1:	  [a]	  The	  three-­‐layer	  hierarchy,	  [b]	  Traditional	  capture,	  [c]	  Soft	  capture	  	  However,	  these	  views	  of	  direct	  capture	  prove	  to	  be	  unsatisfactory.	  If	  the	  theories	  were	  complete,	   we	   would	   observe	   either	   widespread	   direct	   capture	   through	   bribes	   or	  revolving	   doors,	   or	   institutions	   designed	   to	   prevent	   capture	   to	   occur7.	   But	   empirical	  evidences	  on	  regulatory	  capture	  in	  the	  form	  of	  corruption	  are	  scarce8.	  Likewise,	  in-­‐spite	  of	   the	   open	   revolving	   doors	   most	   regulators	   turn	   out	   to	   maintain	   careers	   in	   public	  service	  or	  other	  sectors.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  no	  known	  example	  of	  a	  high-­‐powered	  incentive	  scheme	   for	  a	   sector	   regulator	  based	  on	   industry	   rent	  extraction	  or	  welfare	  gains9.	  We	  thus	  have	  a	  paradox	  of	  capture.	  Neither	  capture	  nor	  its	  remedy	  is	  observed	  in	  practice.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  propose	   an	   alternative	   and	  more	   intuitive	   explanation	   for	   regulatory	   capture	   (see	  figure	   1[c]).	   To	   gain	   influence,	   the	   regulated	   does	   not	   need	   to	   promise	   a	   favor	   to	   the	  regulator.	   Instead,	   the	   regulated	   firms	   can	   influence	   the	   regulatory	   outcome	   by	  producing	   pieces	   of	   information	   relevant	   for	   the	   decision	   makers	   and	   transmit	   this	  information	   for	   free	   to	   the	   regulator10.	   The	   supervisor	   receiving	   a	   report	   from	   the	  industry	   has	   two	   options:	   It	   can	   either	   discard	   it	   and	   produce	   its	   own	   report	   to	   be	  transmitted	  to	  the	  political	  principal	  or	  it	  can	  copy-­‐paste	  the	  industry	  input	  and	  transmit	  it	  to	  the	  principal.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  regulator	  has	  done	  its	  job,	  but	  with	  the	  later	  option,	  





























[a] [b] [c] 
it	  saves	  time	  and	  resources	  as	  the	  information	  processing	  has	  been	  made	  by	  the	  industry.	  We	  argue	  that	  accepting	  industry	  input	  is	  mutually	  profitable	  for	  the	  regulator	  and	  the	  firm.	  The	  regulator	  because	  it	  saves	  on	  the	  information	  processing	  cost	  (or	  effort).	  The	  firm	  because	  it	  controls	  the	  content	  of	  information	  used	  for	  decision	  making.	  Indeed,	  a	  firm	  would	  agree	  to	  transmit	  information	  to	  the	  regulator	  only	  if	  the	  decisions	  resulting	  from	  the	  use	  of	  this	  information	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  more	  favorable	  than	  those	  expected	  from	  the	  internal	  information	  processes	  of	  the	  regulator.	  Information	  (if	  any)	  transmitted	  by	  the	  firm	  is	  necessarily	  biased11.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	   thus	  have	   another	  mechanism	   for	  direct	   capture	   that	   is	   not	  based	  on	   exchange	  of	  favors	  but	  rather	  on	  mutual	   interest.	  This	  mechanism	  is	  different	  from	  lobbying	  as	  the	  regulated	  transmits	  information	  to	  the	  regulator	  and	  not	  to	  the	  politician	  as	  in	  Austen-­‐Smith	  and	  Wright	  (1992)12.	  We	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  mechanism	  as	  soft	  capture	  (Agrell	  and	  Gautier,	  2010).	  This	  approach	  is	  both	  direct	  and	  legal	  and	  we	  conjecture	  that	  this	  form	  of	  capture	   is	   quite	   common	   in	   regulated	   industries;	   we	   illustrate	   that	   by	   looking	   at	   the	  example	  of	  OSHA,	   the	  health	  and	  safety	  regulator	   in	   the	  US	   in	  section	  4.	   	  OSHA	  can	  be	  seen	   as	   an	   example	   where	   the	   regulatory	   agency	   develops	   from	   an	   information	  production	   intermediary	  to	  primarily	  monitoring	   in	  a	  mechanism	  based	  on	   'voluntary'	  or	  'self-­‐regulation'	  by	  the	  regulated	  firms	  (Shapiro	  and	  Rabinowitz,	  2000).	  	  	  	  
2.	  The	  paradox	  of	  capture	  	  	  	  
2.1	  The	  classical	  model	  of	  capture	  	  	  	  Consider	  a	  standard	  problem	  of	  incentive	  regulation.	  The	  regulated	  firm	  supplies	  goods	  or	  services	  to	  customers	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  political	  principal	  but	  the	  latter	  is	  unaware	  of	  the	  firm's	  production	  cost.	  	  The	  principal	  designs	  an	  incentive	  compatible	  contract	  for	  the	  firm	  that	  specifies	  a	  quantity	  to	  be	  produced	  and	  a	  transfer	  to	  the	  firm	  contingent	  on	  a	  cost	  report	  made	  by	  the	   firm;	  A	  standard	  problem	  (see	  Laffont	  and	  Tirole,	  1993).	  At	  the	   optimal	   contract,	   the	   efficient	   firm	   receives	   a	   compensation	   above	   its	   cost	   of	  production,	   the	   so-­‐called	   information	   rent.	   	   This	   rent	   is	   socially	   costly	   and,	   in	   this	  framework,	  the	  regulator	  is	  supposed	  to	  mitigate	  the	  information	  advantage	  of	  the	  firm	  by	  realizing	  a	  costly	  audit	  of	  the	  firm's	  private	  cost	  parameter.	  	  	  	  If	   the	   regulator	   has	   some	   discretion	   when	   it	   reports	   information	   collected	   during	   its	  audit	  to	  the	  political	  principal,	  the	  firm	  is	  ready	  to	  bribe	  the	  regulator	  for	  not	  reporting	  rent-­‐reducing	   information.	   This	   mechanism	   is	   at	   the	   root	   of	   the	   classical	   model	   of	  capture.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  two	  keys	  elements:	  regulatory	  discretion	  and	  information	  rents.	  	  	  	  In	  Tirole	   (1986)	  and	  Laffont	  and	  Tirole	   (1991),	   the	  regulator	  realizes	  a	  costly	  audit	  of	  the	  firm's	  unknown	  cost	  parameter.	  The	  auditing	  technology	  is	  imperfect	  and	  the	  cost	  is	  
                                                11	  We	  disregard	  the	  (hypothetical)	  case	  of	  an	  altruistic	   firm	  e.g.	  under	  public	  ownership.	  First,	  empirical	  evidence	   suggest	   that	   such	   firms	   frequently	   are	   more	   inefficient	   than	   private	   firms	   without	   taking	  voluntary	   action.	   Second,	   the	  managers	   of	   the	   public	   firm	  may	   pursue	   non-­‐altruistic	   objectives	   such	   as	  budget	  maximization	  or	  effort	  minimization,	  but	  of	  which	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  refusal	   to	   submit	   unbiased	   information.	   Third,	   even	   if	   there	   were	   no	   internal	   incentive	   problems,	   a	  rational	  altruistic	  firm	  would	  not	  provide	  unbiased	  information	  processing	  below	  cost.	  12	  When	  the	  firm	  transmits	  information	  to	  the	  regulator,	  the	  later	  remains	  the	  sole	  source	  of	  information	  for	   the	   political	   principal.	   Should	   the	   firm	   transmit	   its	   information	   directly	   to	   the	   political	   principal,	   it	  would	  have	  two	  sources	  of	  information	  and	  it	  would	  be	  able	  to	  improve	  its	  knowledge	  of	  the	  industry.	  
observed	  with	   some	  probability	   lower	   than	  one.	  The	   information	  on	   the	   firm's	   cost	   is	  "hard"	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can	  be	  verified	  by	  the	  political	  principal.	  Thus,	  the	  regulator	  cannot	  produce	   false	  evidences	  on	   the	   firm's	  cost	  but	   it	   can	  hide	   the	  relevant	  piece	  of	  information	  (if	  any)	  to	  the	  principal.	  Concealing	  rent-­‐reducing	  information	  is	  congruent	  with	   the	   regulator's	   degree	   of	   discretion.	   If	   the	   audit	   is	   successful	   and	   its	   results	  reported	   to	   the	   political	   principal,	   the	   regulated	   looses	   its	   information	   rent.	   	   For	   that	  reason,	   the	   firm	   may	   be	   tempted	   to	   bribe	   the	   regulator	   for	   hiding	   the	   results	   of	   a	  successful	  audit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  side	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties	  may	  be	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  but	  enforcement	  of	  the	   side	   contract	   is	   in	  any	   case	  a	  non-­‐trivial	   issue	   (Tirole,	  1986).	  Administrative	   rules	  prohibit	  monetary	  transfer	  from	  the	  industry	  to	  the	  regulators,	  who	  predominantly	  are	  civil	   servants.	   	  Other	  mechanisms	  based	  on	   trust	   or	   reputation	   (Martimort,	   1999)	   are	  necessary	  for	  the	  collusion	  to	  occur.	  Such	  side	  contracts	  may	  thus	  be	  costly	  to	  write	  and	  to	   enforce	   which	   might	   reduce	   the	   scope	   of	   capture.	   In	   addition,	   the	   judicial	  consequences	  from	  detection	  or	  delation	  may	  be	  unbalanced	  between	  the	  firm	  (risking	  a	  fine)	  and	  the	  career	  regulator	  (risking	  dishonorable	  discharge,	  prison	  and	  ruined	  public	  career	  options)	  making	  the	  acceptance	  of	  bribes	  risky	  and	  susceptible	  to	  future	  hold-­‐up	  by	  the	  firm.	  	  	  Facing	  the	  possibility	  of	  capture,	  the	  political	  principal	  must	  either	  tolerate	  capture	  and	  consequently	   rethink	   the	   role	   devoted	   to	   the	   regulatory	   institution,	   or	   design	   a	  collusion-­‐proof	   regulatory	   process	   that	   is	   immune	   to	   capture.	   In	   Tirole	   (1986)	   the	  political	   principal	   decentralizes	   its	   objective	   to	   prevent	   collusion	   and	   pays	   a	  compensation	  for	  a	  successful	  audit	  that	   is	  at	   least	  as	  big	  as	  the	  perceived	  value	  of	  the	  bribe	  paid	  by	  the	  firm14.	  	  Preventing	  capture	  is	  thus	  costly	  for	  the	  principal	  as	  the	  cost	  of	  appointing	  a	  supervisor	  increases.	  	  In	  practice,	  regulatory	  institutions	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  designed	   to	   prevent	   the	   occurrence	   of	   this	   form	  of	   capture	   as,	   to	   our	   knowledge,	   few	  regulators	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  regulatory	  outcome15.	  	  	  	  	  	  Capture	  is,	  by	  definition,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  empirically.	  In	  a	  rare	  attempt	   to	   test	   capture	   with	   detailed	   data	   from	   regulatory	   activities,	   Smith	   and	  Söderberg	  (2010)	  found	  no	  support	  for	  the	  regulatory	  capture	  hypothesis.	  They	  focus	  on	  the	   treatment	   of	   customer	   complaints	   by	   the	   Swedish	   Energy	   Agency	   (SEA).	   The	  resolution	   of	   these	   complains	   is	   delegated	   to	   a	   civil	   servant	   that	   could	   be	   either	   pro-­‐consumer	  or	  pro-­‐firm	  but	   this	   information	   is	  not	  known	  ex-­‐ante.	  The	  SEA	  can	  replace	  the	  agent	  if	  it	  believes	  that	  her	  (revealed)	  preferences	  are	  incompatible	  or	  non-­‐aligned	  with	  those	  of	  the	  institution,	  in	  which	  case,	  the	  agent	  is	  re-­‐assigned	  to	  another	  function.	  Capture	  in	  this	  context	  would	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  probability	  of	  termination	  if	  a	  agency	  agent	  proves	  to	  be	  pro-­‐consumer.	  The	  data	  does	  not	  confirm	  this	  hypothesis	  and	  rather	   suggest	   that	   a	   bureaucrat	   that	   takes	   pro-­‐industry	   decisions	   has	   a	   higher	  probability	  of	  being	  removed	  compared	  to	  a	  pro-­‐consumer	  decision-­‐maker.	  	  	  	  
                                                14	  In	  most	  of	  the	  models	  of	  capture,	  side-­‐contracting	  is	  costly	  meaning	  that,	  when	  the	  firm	  pays	  $1	  to	  the	  regulator,	  the	  latter	  has	  less	  than	  (the	  equivalent	  of)	  $1	  in	  its	  pocket.	  Transaction	  cost	  of	  side	  contracting	  reduces	  the	  possibility	  of	  capture.	  15	  An	   exception	   could	   be	   the	   election	   of	   regulators	   that	   are	   thus	   responsible	   in	   front	   of	   the	   voters	   (see	  Guerriero,	  2011).	  	  	  	  
Anecdotical	   evidences	   on	   capture	   remain	   relatively	   rare.	   Few	   regulators	   have	   been	  found	   guilty	   of	   corruption	   though	   many	   have	   shown	   sympathies	   with	   the	   industry.	  Evidences	   of	   bribed	   regulators	   are	   relatively	   inconclusive	   and	   the	   traditional	   view	   of	  capture	  has	  weak	  empirical	  support.	  	  	  	  
2.2	  Revolving	  doors	  	  The	  doors	  between	  regulatory	  agencies	  and	  the	  industry	  are	  not	  closed.	  Many	  regulators	  have	   an	   industry	   background	   (they	   are	   coming	   'in'	   the	   revolving	   doors).	   Part	   of	   the	  regulatory	   staff	   is	   also	   moving	   'out'	   of	   the	   revolving	   doors	   to	   a	   job	   in	   industry16.	  Appointing	  regulator	  with	  an	  industry	  background	  is	  a	  mean	  to	  bring	  industry	  specific	  knowledge	  to	  the	  regulatory	  agency.	  Likewise,	  expertise	  of	  former	  regulators	  is	  valuable	  to	   the	   industry	   that	   can	   then	   minimize	   the	   cost	   of	   complying	   with	   regulations.	   Che	  (1995)	   and	   Salant	   (1995)	   emphasis	   on	   the	   potential	   incentive	   effect	   of	   the	   revolving	  doors	  that	  may	  stimulate	  acquisition	  of	  industry	  specific	  human	  capital.	  But	  opening	  the	  revolving	  doors	  is	  also	  a	  concern	  as	  it	  could	  bias	  the	  regulatory	  decisions	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  industry.	  	  	  	  Regulators	  with	  an	  industry	  background	  may	  still	  look	  at	  issues	  with	  industry	  eyes	  and	  show	   sympathy	   for	   the	   view	   expressed	   by	   the	   regulated.	   Regulators	   coming	   in	   the	  revolving	   doors	   may	   identify	   themselves	   with	   the	   industry	   with,	   as	   consequences,	   a	  biased	  regulation	  that	  favors	  the	  industry.	  	  	  	  Moving	  out	  of	  the	  revolving	  doors	  may	  also	  bias	  regulation.	  The	  perspective	  of	  posterior	  employment	   in	   the	   regulated	   industry	  may	   discipline	   the	   regulators	   and	   lead	   to	   pro-­‐industry	   regulations.	   Regulators	   may	   be	   lenient	   in	   applying	   rules	   in	   order	   to	   attract	  attention	   from	   the	   industry	   and	   signal	   their	   interest	   for	   the	   industry	   views	   with	   the	  hope	  of	  a	  later	  career	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  a	  future	  job	  in	  the	  industry	  acts	  like	  the	  bribe	  in	  the	  traditional	  model.	  It	  is	  the	  reward	  paid	  by	  the	  industry	  in	  return	  of	  favors	  made	  by	  the	  regulator.	  There	  are	  however	   differences	   between	   bribes	   and	   post-­‐regulatory	   employment	   within	   the	  industry.	  First,	   there	  is	  no	  need	  of	  explicit	  contract	  or	  agreement	  between	  parties.	  The	  industry	  could	  have	  the	  tradition	  and	  the	  reputation	  to	  reward	  regulators	  that	  behaved	  well	  in	  the	  past.	  Capture	  is	  based	  on	  an	  implicit	  and	  imperfectly	  enforceable	  agreement	  between	   parties.	   Second,	   unlike	   bribes,	   it	   is	   not	   illegal	   to	   appoint	   in	   the	   industry	  someone	   with	   a	   regulatory	   experience.	   Revolving	   doors	   is	   the	   legal	   version	   of	   direct	  capture	  based	  on	  reciprocity.	  	  	  	  To	   our	   knowledge,	   there	   is	   only	   one	   paper	   that	   explicitly	   tests	   the	   regulatory	   bias	  associated	  created	  by	   the	  revolving	  doors.	  Makkai	  and	  Braithwaite	  (1992)	  collect	  data	  on	  site	  inspections	  realized	  in	  Australian	  nursing	  homes.	  They	  test	  whether	  the	  degree	  of	  regulatory	  enforcement	  depends	  on	  prior	  experience	  in	  the	  industry	  or	  aspiration	  to	  leave	  to	  job	  in	  the	  industry	  .	  Their	  study	  does	  not	  confirm	  the	  revolving	  door	  hypothesis.	  First,	   regulatory	   enforcement	   records	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   prior	   industry	   experience.	  Second,	   softer	   inspectors	   do	   not	   have	   a	   higher	   probability	   of	   leaving	   to	   job	   in	   the	  industry.	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  Thatcher	   (2002)	  provides	   evidence	  on	   the	   importance	  of	   the	   revolving	  doors	  phenomena	   in	   selected	  European	  countries.	  
	  The	   traditional	   capture	   and	   the	   revolving	   doors	   conjecture	   do	   not	   received	   a	   strong	  empirical	   support	   and	   evidences	   of	   regulatory	   capture	   based	   on	   reciprocity	   remain	  scare	   and	   mainly	   inconclusive.	   Lack	   of	   support	   for	   direct	   capture	   means	   that	   either	  regulatory	  institutions	  are	  well-­‐designed	  and	  they	  effectively	  prevent	  capture	  by	  special	  interest	  groups	  or	  that	  capture	  takes	  another,	  possibly	  more	  pervasive,	   form.	  We	  have	  rejected	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  and	  we	  will	  now	  examine	  the	  second	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.	  Soft	  capture	  	  
3.1	  The	  mechanism	  of	  soft	  capture	  	  	  	  We	   propose	   an	   alternative	   mechanism	   for	   regulatory	   capture	   that	   is	   not	   driven	   by	  reciprocity	  but	  by	  mutual	   interest.	   	   This	  mechanism,	   that	  we	   call	   soft	   capture,	   is	   both	  direct	  and	  legal	  and	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  production	  of	  biased	  information	  by	  the	  firm	  itself	  (see	  Agrell	   and	  Gautier	   (2010)	   for	   a	   formal	  model).	   	   In	   the	   three-­‐layer	   hierarchy,	   the	  regulator	  acts	  as	  an	  information	  gathering	  intermediate	  and	  production	  of	   information	  is	   costly.	   	   Now	   suppose	   that	   the	   regulator	   receives	   information	   from	   the	   firm.	   	   One	  option	   available	   to	   the	   regulator	   is	   to	   endorse	   the	   information	   produced	   by	   the	  regulated	   and	   present	   it	   to	   the	   decision	  maker.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   resources	   normally	  devolved	  to	  information	  gathering	  can	  be	  used	  for	  another	  purpose	  such	  as	  monitoring	  compliance	  with	  the	  rules.	  	  	  A	  regulator	  that	  would	  use	  industry	  input	  saves	  resources:	  the	  staff	  that	  is	  not	  used	  to	  collect	   information	  and	  draft	  a	  report	  can	  be	  used	  to	  other	  regulatory	  tasks.	  	  	  Regulators	  are	  thus	  likely	  to	  accept	  industry	  input	  as	  substitute	  to	  in-­‐house	   produced	   information.	   	   	   This	   can	   take	   many	   forms	   from	   making	   its	   own	   an	  argument	  putted	  forward	  by	  a	  consultancy	  financed	  by	  the	  industry	  to	  endorsing	  fully-­‐fledge	  sectorial	  regulation	  	  drafted	  by	  the	  industry	  itself17.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  information	  by	  the	  firm	  might	  be	  strange	  and	  counterproductive	  in	  a	  context	  where	  the	  firm	  benefits	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  of	  the	  deciding	  party.	  	  	  But	   the	   alternative	   consists	   in	   having	   the	   regulator	   gathering	   the	   information	   itself,	   a	  solution	   that	   could	   be	   even	  worse	   for	   the	   firm.	   	   	   	   Transmission	   of	   information	   to	   the	  regulator	  is	  a	  profitable	  alternative	  for	  the	  firm	  if	  (i)	  regulatory	  decisions	  are	  based	  on	  the	  firm	  input	  and	  (ii)	  information	  is	  biased.	  	  	  This	  last	  condition	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  soft	  capture	  mechanism	  to	  work.	  	  	  Firms	  accept	  to	  produce	  and	  transmit	  information	  only	  if	  using	   this	   information	   for	   regulation	   benefits	   to	   the	   firm.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   industry	  inputs	  must	  be	  systematically	  biased.	   	   	  Being	  regulated	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  an	   information	  tailored	  to	  their	  need	  is	  much	  more	  profitable	  for	  the	  industry	  than	  being	  regulated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  independent	  information.	  	  Thus	  the	  information	  transmitted	  by	  the	  firm	  to	  the	  regulator	  is	  necessarily	  biased.	  	  	  Disclosing	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis	  true	  information	  would	  be	  foolish	  for	  firms	  as	  the	  key	  for	  successful	  regulation	  is	  access	  to	  information.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  soft	  capture	  mechanism	  thus	  works	  as	  follows	  :	  the	  regulated	  firm	  transmits	  biased	  information	   to	   the	   regulator,	   the	   later	   endorses	   it	   and	   reports	   industry	   input	   to	   the	  decision	  maker.	   	   	  Regulation	   is	  ultimately	  based	  on	   information	  controlled	  by	   the	   firm	  rather	  than	  on	  information	  collected	  by	  an	  independent	  supervisor,	  which	  is	  beneficial	  to	  the	  firm.	  	  The	  mechanism	  is	  also	  profitable	  for	  the	  regulator	  that	  saves	  on	  information	  
                                                17	  In	  2001	  the	  Swedish	  energy	  regulator	  (STEM)	  endorsed	  a	  detailed	  voluntary	  service	  regulation	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  electricity	  distribution,	  developed	  by	  the	  sector	  association.	  
gathering	   costs.	   	   	   Moreover,	   accepting	   and	   endorsing	   industry	   produced	   information	  potentially	  reduces	  the	  conflicts	  between	  the	  regulator	  and	  the	  industry,	  a	  behavior	  that	  might	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  minimal	  squawk	  behavior	  described	  by	  Leaver	  (2009).	  	  	  	  Soft	   capture	   is	   not	   based	   on	   threats	   and	   rewards:	   both	   parties	   are	   better	   off	   if	   the	  regulator	  rubber-­‐stamps	  the	  information	  produced	  by	  the	  firm	  instead	  of	  producing	  its	  own.	  The	  regulator	  comes	  to	  the	  political	  principal	  with	  information	  (as	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  do).	   The	   firm,	   if	   it	   transmits	   less	   precise	   information,	   increases	   its	   information	   rent.	  Hence,	  capture	  benefits	  both	  parties	  without	  requiring	  any	  form	  of	  side	  contracting	  nor	  side	  payments	  between	  parties.	   	   Thus,	   there	   is	  no	   smoking	  gun	  when	   the	   regulator	   is	  softly	   captured	  by	   the	   firm.	   	  For	   that	   reason,	  we	  classified	   in	   table	  1	   soft	   capture	  as	  a	  direct	   and	   legal	  mechanism.	   	   Financing	   partisan	  R&D	   is	   obviously	   not	   illegal	   and	   it	   is	  somehow	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  firm	  is	  a	  lazy	  regulator	  uses	  it	  instead	  of	  realizing	  its	  own	  researches.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.2	  Implications	  for	  regulatory	  design	  	  Even	  if	  in	  this	  mechanism	  the	  firm	  produces	  information	  for	  free	  and	  transmits	  it	  to	  the	  regulator,	   soft	   capture	   is	   damageable	   to	   the	   political	   principal	   and	   to	   the	   welfare.	  	  	  Tolerated	   soft	   capture	   indeed	   decreases	   the	   quality	   of	   decision-­‐making	   because	  information	   is	   less	   precise	   and	   biased	   but	   it	   leaves	   unchanged	   the	   cost	   of	   gathering	  information.	  	  	  Producing	  detailed	  information	  for	  regulatory	  purpose	  is	  profitable	  for	  the	  firm	   only	   if	   the	   alternative	   is	   a	  more	   stringent	   regulation	   based	   on	   the	  more	   precise	  information	   produced	   by	   the	   regulatory	   agency.	   	   	   	   Essential	   in	   this	  mechanism	   is	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  regulator	  as	  a	   'threat'	   to	  extract	   the	  biased	   information	   from	  the	   firm.	  	  	  Should	  this	  threat	  disappear,	  the	  firm	  will	  no	  longer	  produce	  information18.	  	  	  	  	  Maintaining	   a	   regulator,	   even	   if	   it	   only	   rubbers-­‐stamp	   the	   industry	   proposals,	   is	  essential	  to	  benefit	  from	  information	  for	  regulatory	  design.	  	  	  Absent	  the	  middle-­‐layer	  in	  the	   hierarchy,	   there	   is	   no	   information	   at	   all	   going	   from	   the	   industry	   to	   the	   top-­‐layer.	  	  	  Firms	  have	  incentives	  to	  softly	  capture	  the	  regulator	  only	  if	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  independent	  regulation	  is	  sufficiently	  powerful.	   	   	  When	  it	  occurs,	  soft	  capture	   leaves	  unchanged	  the	  cost	   of	   the	   supervision	   agency	   but	   it	   decreases	   the	   quality	   of	   information	   since	   firms	  introduce	  additional	  bias	  in	  their	  messages.	  	  Soft	  capture	  thus	  unambiguously	  decreases	  the	  welfare.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  a	  formal	  model	  of	  soft	  capture	  (Agrell	  and	  Gautier,	  2010),	  we	  show	  that	  soft	  capture	  might	  be	  tolerated	  at	  the	  equilibrium	  if	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  biased	  information	  produced	  by	  the	  firm	  is	  high	  enough	  relative	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  information	  (potentially)	  produced	  by	  the	  regulator.	  	  	  This	  implies	  that	  	  	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  bias	  introduced	  by	  the	  firm	  is	  directly	   linked	  to	  the	  treat	  exerted	  by	  the	  regulator.	   	   	   	  An	  under-­‐staffed	  regulator	  with	  limited	   capabilities	   for	   gathering	   and	   processing	   information	   is	   likely	   to	   receive	  considerably	  biased	  industry	  input.	  	  	  	  Conversely,	  a	  regulator	  that	  is	  able	  to	  produce	  high	  quality	  information,	  that	  is	  highly	  damaging	  for	  the	  firm's	  rent,	  is	  likely	  to	  receive	  more	  accurate	  information	  (but	  still	  biased)	  from	  the	  firm.	  	  	  Maintaining	  high-­‐level	  regulators	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  This	  effect	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  lobbying	  models	  (Cf.	  Austen-­‐Smith	  and	  Wright,	  1992):	  a	   lobbyist	   would	   only	   invest	   in	   costly	   information	   transmission	   provided	   the	   [regulator]	   enjoys	   a	  sufficiently	   low	  cost	  of	   independent	   information	  acquisition,	  or	  else	  the	  message	  would	  be	  discarded	  by	  default	  as	  non-­‐informative.	  	  
remains	  important	  even	  if	  the	  political	  principal	  may	  tolerate	  capture	  and	  participation	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  the	  regulatory	  process.	   	   	  When	  the	  threat	  exerted	  by	  the	  regulator	  is	  not	   strong	   enough,	   the	   industry	  may	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   information	   that,	   at	   the	   end,	  leads	  to	  an	  ineffective	  regulation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Facing	  this	  form	  of	  capture,	  it	  is	  thus	  essential	  to	  have	  highly	  skilled	  regulators.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  regulator	  remains	  'a	  regulator	  as	  being',	  it	  forces	  the	  firm	  to	  produce	  not	  too	  biased	  information.	   	  Multiplying	  and	  diversifying	  the	  sources	  of	  information	  might	  be	  another	  path	  to	  prevent	  capture.	   	   If	   it	   is	  known	  that	  regulators	  are	   likely	  to	  accept	  cooperative	  inputs	  from	  the	  industry,	  additional	  sources	  of	  information	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  useful.	  	  Guerriero	  (2011)	  documents	  that	  rate	  reviews	  for	  regulated	  US	  electricity	  distributors	  are	   organized	   as	   quasi-­‐judicial	   hearings	   where	   all	   the	   interested	   parties	   (firms,	  customers...)	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   bring	   information	   to	   the	   regulatory	   commission	  (PUC).	   	   Rate	   reviews	   are	   thus	   less	   dependent	   on	   the	   regulator's	   ability	   to	   gather	  information	   from	  the	   industry.	  Parties	  are	   thus	  advocate	  of	   their	   interest	  and	  multiple	  sources	  of	  biased	  information	  may	  mitigate	  the	  problem	  created	  by	  capture19.	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.	  An	  illustrating	  example	  	  	  The	   Occupational	   Safety	   and	   Health	   Administration	   (OSHA)	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  regulation,	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   of	   workplace	   health	   and	   safety	   in	   the	   USA	  under	   the	   Occupational	   Safety	   and	   Health	   Act	   of	   1970.	   The	   economic	   and	   social	  importance	   of	   the	   regulation	   is	   paramount,	   directly	   affecting	   about	   130	   million	  employees	   in	   USA	   (2010)	   and	   the	   workplace	   conditions,	   routines	   and	   equipment	   at	  about	  9	  million	  establishments	  (2009).	  	  Despite	  its	  importance,	  the	  literature	  only	  lists	  a	  single	  case	  of	  attempted	  corruption	  of	  OSHA	  inspectors	  (US	  v.	  Chmielewski,	  1999),	  the	  amount	  of	  which	  was	  modest	  ($2,000).	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  the	  regulatory	  endowment	  has	  remained	  constant	  or	  even	  slightly	  decreased	  in	  absolute	  terms	  (-­‐12	  	  %	  in	  staff	  fte	  between	  1975	  and	  2009)	  ,	  whereas	  the	  numbers	  of	  employees	   and	   establishments	   to	   monitor	   have	   increased	   by	   90	   	   %	   and	   128	   	   %,	  respectively.	  As	   seen	   in	  Figure	  2,	   the	  number	  of	   establishments	   to	  be	   regulated	  vastly	  outnumber	  the	  staff,	  radically	  increasing	  the	  potential	  workload.	  	  	  The	  development	  of	  new	  regulations	  at	  OSHA	  is	  de	  facto	  based	  on	  reediting	  of	  material	  as	  "national	  consensus	  standards",	  developed	  by	  "trade	  or	  professional	  associations	  for	  the	  practices,	  systems,	  processes,	  or	  raw	  materials	  of	  their	  members"(Hamilton,	  note	  13,	  1978).	   The	   independent	   development	   of	   safety	   standards	   at	   OSHA	   is	   infrequent	   (two	  new	  standards	  promulgated	  between	  1992	  and	  2000)	  and	  slow	  (four	  to	  seven	  years,	  cf.	  Shapiro	  and	  Rabinowitz,	  2000).	  	  Regulatory	  rule	  making	  in	  occupational	  safety	  at	  OSHA	  is	   based	   on	   three	   analysis	   steps:	   determination	   of	   significant	   risk,	   technological	  feasibility	  analysis	  and	  economic	  feasibility	  analysis.	  Given	  the	  weak	  resources	  for	  data	  collection,	   the	   initial	   step	   is	   often	   delayed	   or	   ineffective,	   potentially	   through	   the	  allocation	  of	  inspections	  to	  sites.	  The	  economic	  analysis	  is	  largely	  based	  on	  information	  commissioned	  by	  regulated	  firms	  or	  industry	  associations,	  in	  essence	  private	  standards	  that	  are	  forwarded	  to	  be	  promulgated	  as	  regulatory	  standards.	  	  	  
                                                19	  Dewatripont	  and	  Tirole	  (1999).	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combined	  with	  very	  moderate	  fines21	  for	  'willful'	  violations	  of	  the	  standards	  renders	  the	  regulator	  relatively	  harmless	  to	  the	  regulated	  sector.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  highest	  officer	  in	  OSHA,	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Labor	  for	   Occupational	   Safety	   and	   Health,	   unlike	   the	   administration's	   staff,	   is	   directly	  appointed	  by	  the	  President	  and	  does	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  statue	  of	  a	  civil	  servant.	  This	  specific	  conditions	  allows	  a	  casual	   test	  of	   the	   'revolving	  door'	  hypothesis,	  as	  the	  direct	  capture	   could	  be	  exercised	  by	   the	   submitting	  bodies	   through	   later	  employment	   in	  e.g.	  associations	   or	   employer's	   organizations.	   However,	   the	   evidence	   is	   inconclusive:	   only	  two	   of	   the	   12	   past	   Assistant	   Secretaries	   since	   the	   creation	   of	   OSHA	   have	   obtained	  managerial	   positions	   in	   private	   industry,	   with	   five	   remaining	   in	   public	   service	   or	  research.	   Further,	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   rulings	   from	   OSHA	   reveals	   that	   the	   'soft	  capture'	   occurred	   already	   after	   a	   few	   years	   of	   existence	   and	   was	   well	   established	   in	  1978	   (Hamilton,	   1978).	  Hence,	   the	   continued	   state	   of	   'soft	   capture'	   in	  OSHA	   could	   be	  seen	  more	  as	  a	  structural	  response	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  political	  endorsement	  of	  the	  regulatory	   activity	   is	   low	   or	   uncertain	   in	   combination	   with	   low	   independence	   of	   the	  regulatory	   supervisor.	   It	   seems	   plausible	   that	   the	   regulatory	   function	   of	   OSHA	   could	  have	   been	   implemented	   more	   effectively	   with	   the	   similar	   federal	   staff	   numbers	   if	  redirected	   to	   regulatory	   design	   and	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   were	   left	   to	   civil	  enforcement22.	  However,	  faced	  with	  the	  prospects	  of	  confronting	  industry	  with	  stringent	  labor	  regulations	  and	  potentially	   large	  civil	   lawsuits,	   the	  regulators	  seem	  to	  prefer	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  industry	  endorsement	  in	  the	  regulatory	  design	  stage	  while	  maintaining	  a	  relatively	   undisputed	   (yet	   ineffective)	   monitoring	   activity	   as	   the	   visible	   information	  processing	  to	  the	  political	  principal.	  	  	  	  Remains	   to	   investigate	   whether	   the	   'soft	   capture'	   in	   this	   case	   is	   welfare	   decreasing.	  Although	  the	  USA	  naturally	  benefits	  from	  the	  same	  occupational	  safety	  development	  as	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  industrialized	  world,	  data	  shows	  (Figure	  3)	  that	  the	  improvement	  rate	  1998-­‐2007	  is	  slower	  than	  for	  a	  comparative	  market,	  EU-­‐25,	  and	  stagnating	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period.	  The	   absolute	   level	   of	   fatal	   accidents	  per	  100,000	   employees	   is	   also	  higher	  than	  in	  EU-­‐25,	  indicating	  a	  continuing	  problem.	  	  	  	  
5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  	  Regulatory	   capture	   is	   a	   composite	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   multiple	   expressions	   and	  causes.	   In	   this	   paper	  we	   address	   a	   specific	   type,	   direct	   legal	   capture	   by	   the	   regulated	  firm,	   that	   we	   claim	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	  most	   common	   scenarios.	   Our	   relatively	   intuitive	  model	  of	   'soft	  capture'	   is	  based	  on	  self-­‐enforced	  collusion	  between	  the	   firm,	  providing	  biased	   information	   for	   free,	   and	   the	   regulator,	   using	   this	   information	   in	   its	   regulation	  rather	   than	   providing	   costly	   internal	   information	   processing.	   It	   differs	   from	   the	  conventional	  models	  of	  capture	  in	  the	  setup	  and	  the	  empirical	  conclusions.	  	  	  	  
                                                21	  The	  monetary	  fines	  have	  been	  increased	  once	  during	  1971-­‐2010.	  Maximum	  fine	  for	  'willful'	  violation	  of	  safety	  standards,	  potentially	  leading	  to	  death	  of	  employees	  is	  $7,000.	  Maximum	  penalty	  for	  death	  caused	  by	  willful	  negligence	  of	  workplace	  safety	  is	  $70,000.	  The	  average	  OSHA	  	  	  penalty	  is	  $1,000,	  normally	  even	  deadly	   accidents	   receive	   small	   penalties	   (median	   initial	   penalty	   claimed	   by	   OSHA	   	   	   for	   accidents	   with	  death	   involved	  was	  $5,700	   in	  2007).	   Source:	  Testimony	  by	  Assistant	  Secretary	  David	  Michels	   to	   the	  US	  	  	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  March	  16,	  2010.	  22	  Currently	  the	  case	  for	  environmental	  regulation,	  e.g.	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act.	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regulation	   and	   enforcement.	   No	   evidence	   of	   high-­‐level	   corruption,	   nor	   of	   revolving	  doors	   between	   firms	   and	   the	   regulator,	   has	   been	   found.	   Hence,	   we	   have	   at	   hand	   an	  example	   of	   soft	   capture.	   Qualitatively,	   lowered	   information	   processing	   costs,	   e.g.	   by	  higher	  endowment	  in	  qualified	  staff	  or	  budgets	  for	  external	  independent	  experts,	  would	  result	   in	   lower	   incidence	   of	   soft	   capture,	   detected	   as	   a	  more	   stringent	   regulation	   and	  higher	  enforcement	  precision.	  	  	  The	  previous	   'paradox	  of	   capture'	  has	   thus	   found	  one	  possible	  explanation	  along	  with	  several	   empirically	   verifiable	   hypotheses.	   Further	   empirical	   work	   about	   regulatory	  capture,	  both	  longitudinal	  and	  across	  sectors,	  is	  necessary	  to	  fully	  validate	  with	  validity	  of	  this	  and	  alternative	  models	  in	  understanding	  this	  socially	  important	  phenomenon.	  	  	  	  An	  interesting	  extension	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  made	  for	  the	  case	  of	  direct	  capture	  by	  other	  stakeholders,	   such	   as	   downstream	   clients,	   since	   the	   regulator	   merely	   reacts	   to	  submitted	  information	  from	  any	  source.	  Although	  the	  authors	  ignore	  such	  examples	  in	  actual	   regulatory	   practice	   in	   Europe,	   plausibly	   due	   to	   problems	   of	   information	  asymmetry	  and	  internal	  cost	  allocation	  within	  the	  stakeholder	  collective,	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  US-­‐type	  intervenor	  process	  at	  the	  Public	  Utility	  Commissions	  is	  analogous.	  In	  this	  manner,	  an	  "information	  contest"	  between	  advocates	  representing	  different	  interest	  groups	   might	   be	   a	   more	   effective	   way	   to	   collect	   information	   than	   a	   single	   source	   of	  information	  captured	  by	  the	  industry23.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  example	  notwithstanding,	  there	  is	  no	  claim	  of	  generality	  emanating	  from	  the	  model.	  Both	  the	  literature	  (cf.	  Makkai	  and	  Braithwaite,	  1992)	  and	  the	  anecdotal	  evidence	  above	  suggest	   that	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   political	   principal	   and	   the	   supervisor,	   the	  independence	  give	  to	  the	  latter	  and	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  former	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  are	   important	   in	  understanding	   the	   internal	   and	  external	   functioning	  of	   regulation.	   In	  particular,	   for	   the	   OSHA	   case,	   the	   implicit	   acceptance	   by	   the	   political	   principal	   (US	  	  	  Government)	   of	   the	   soft	   capture	   over	   a	   longer	   time	   period	   constitutes,	   without	   ever	  becoming	   an	   official	   endorsement,	   an	   indication	   of	   indirect	   capture	   rigged	   by	   the	  political	   principal	   and	   the	   regulated	   firm.	   Moreover	   the	   methodological	   complexities	  involved	  in	  empirically	  estimating	  the	  overall	  welfare	  effects	  of	  regulatory	  capture,	  yet	  alone	   sector	   regulation	   and	   its	   means,	   are	   significant	   and	   hampering	   comparative	  analysis.	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